the power of decision? In contemporary terminology, we model the balance of power between the two houses. However, rather than resorting to factors such as moderation, independence, considered opinion or constructive criticism, as the second epigraph suggests, we offer an institutional answer: the power of the upper house is a function of the institutional features of the political system.
In bicameral legislatures, the interaction between the two houses is crucial to understanding legislative outcomes. Examination of the legislative process in only one house ignores strategic aspects of legislation generated by the existence of the second house. Consider the following, not so hypothetical, example: Members of Parliament of the popularly elected house can vote in favor of a particularly popular measure which they disapprove, knowing that the non-directly elected second house will vote it down; if mutual agreement is required, the legislation will be aborted. In this case, observation of voting patterns in the lower house alone would be completely misleading.
There are few comparative analyses of the relative power of houses in bicameral legislatures.3 One reason for the paucity of cross-national studies is the contemporary division between the United States and European analyses of upper houses. Second houses in federal political systems, such as in the United States, are generally regarded as legitimate and powerful, whereas in the predominantly unitary political systems of Europe, second houses are viewed as weak and redundant. This dichotomy is widely acknowledged. Roskin (1986: 9) claims that "two chambers are necessary in federal systems to represent the component parts, but they are often extra baggage in unitary systems." Similarly, Trivelli (1975: 33-34), remarks that "the idea of protecting different interests in unitary systems has tended to decline. In federal systems, on the other hand, the legitimacy of second houses remains strong .... .No one contests that, in federal legislatures, there are two distinct forces, each of which should be represented; on the one hand, the population of the entire country, and on the other, more or less autonomous political units which together form the federation."
The main source of this cleavage in the literature arises from the contemporary role allocated to second houses in unitary and federal political systems. Initially, upper houses in both types of political systems fulfilled similar roles: "political," or the representation of specific interests, and "efficient," or the improvement and continuity of legislation.4 In unitary systems, as the source of legitimacy of upper house power -the representation of landed, commercial and industrial wealth declined, the existence of an upper house was questioned. In some cases, upper houses were dissolved permanently as in Denmark and Sweden. Others saw their institutional power curtailed as in the United Kingdom and France. Legislative analyses in these countries tend to be couched in terms of Mastias and Grange's perspective: the upper house plays an efficient role and relies on the special wisdom and expertise of its members. Influence is independent of, or even inversely proportional to, the upper house's institutional power. In federal systems, in contrast, the legitimacy of the upper house -representing territorial interests -has remained strong. As a result, legislative studies emphasize the "political" role of the upper house and analyze the relative power of the two houses. The US system of conference committees, for example, has received considerable attention. 5 We argue that upper houses in both unitary and federal political systems continue to play both political and efficient roles, and that a single model is applicable. Because the "navette system" (English: "shuttle"), in conjunction with various stopping rules, is the most frequently employed system of resolving disagreements, we model this system of legislative conflict resolution. In this system, a bill is transmitted between the two houses until both pass identical versions of the legislation or until some stopping rule is applied. Even in the United States, where the primary empirical focus involves the conference committee, the navette process is used to resolve the majority of disagreements between the two houses.6
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we describe the common characteristics of second houses in unitary and federal systems. We then show how the analytical emphasis in unitary systems shifted to the efficient role of upper houses whereas the political role became dominant in federal systems. This shift obscures political and institutional elements common to both federal and unitary systems. In the next section, we give a verbal description of a mathematical model that allows us to make comparative statements about the relative power of upper and lower houses in bicameral legislatures. We find that institutional features, such as stopping rules, where a bill is introduced, and the number of shuttles between houses, are systematically related to upper house power. In the final section, we compare the institutional features that influence upper house power in thirty-three countries that employ the navette system.
Bicameralism in Historical Perspective
Bicameralism is an important legislative tradition in Western nations. Historically, the British bicameral system evolved as a separation of the nobility of the robe and the sword from the commoners -the House of Lords and the House of Commons. As representative systems evolved and constitutions were written, a theoretical justification was provided to defend a two-house legislature. Three distinct reasons were given for a dual legislative system: the representation of distinct interests; stability; and quality assurance. Initially, all three justifications were employed in constitutional debates of both unitary and federal systems. The United States and France serve as examples of the parallel reasoning applied to bicameral legislatures.
The American senate is undoubtedly best known for the representation of interests: the "great compromise" provided that the House of Representatives would be elected on the basis of the population whereas the Senate would grant equal representation for each state. The compromise protected the interests of the small states against the domination of the large and obtained the consent of the small states to the new constitution (United States, Senate, 1987). States, it was argued, had specific and distinct interests from the population as a whole. This being the case, an "advantage accruing from the Senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States" (Hamilton et al., 1788: 402).
But the authors of the Federalist papers also argued that the existence of a Senate improved stability and the quality of legislation. The longer electoral terms of the Senators permitted them to become "professional" legislators who were better supplied with a "knowledge of the means by which [the object of good government] can best be obtained" (Hamilton et al., 1788: 404) . Moreover, the Senate provided an anchor for legislation subject to the changing whims of the lower house, which was characterized by "mutability in public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members" (Hamilton et al., 1788: 405) .
On the other side of the Atlantic, Montesquieu defended the institution of a twochambered legislative branch in terms parallel to the US debate.7 Montesquieu first offered a "social justification" for a second house, "to permit a better representation of the different corps of the nation" (quoted in Trivelli, 1975: 30 In unitary systems the role of upper houses grew problematic as suffrage was expanded and as democratic attitudes were adopted. Initially, the problem was resolved by attributing the need for a strong upper house to the representation of "minorities" rather than to the aristocracy.8 But eventually, upper houses were confronted with the fact that, in order to stand up to the popular house on behalf of minorities, "a Second Chamber was found to need a democratic basis which could only be secured by some form of popular election" (Campion, 1953/54: 20) .
According to the literature, unitary systems selected one of two solutions (Campion, 1953/54 ). Either the nation followed the road of electoral reform, in which case the upper house became more or less congruent with the lower house and divergences disappeared; or it retained its selection procedures and relegated the second house to efficient, apolitical functions. Legitimacy is so little questioned that it is completely excluded from contemporary discussions of bicameral legislatures in the United States. Given the emphasis on the Senate's political role, analysts immediately ask which house has the most power. Since most of the important legislation is referred to conference committee, this "third house" of the American legislature receives the most attention (Fenno, 1966; Ferejohn, 1974 Ferejohn, , 1975 Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976; Ippolito, 1981 Ippolito, , 1983 Kanter, 1972; Krehbiel, 1987; Manley, 1970; Weingast, 1984, 1987; Steiner, 1951; Rundquist, 1976, 1977; Vogler, 1970 Vogler, , 1971 .
The distinction between the political role of upper houses in federal systems and the efficient role in unitary systems has been pushed further than a description of facts. The argument has been made that the two roles of the Senate, political and efficient, are mutually exclusive. According to Campion (1953/54: 32), "strong" second chambers are so dominated by party politics that efficient functions are completely displaced. If the upper house is politically incongruent, "however much it may set out to be useful, in the end party spirit will use its strength to kill its usefulness." On the other hand, efficient second chambers are free to perform their "minor but valuable functions in a spirit of objectivity." In contrast, we argue that upper houses can and do play both political and efficient roles. The original constitutional analyses demonstrate that the roles were initially viewed as complementary rather than contradictory. Our examples from the United Kingdom and France indicate that although upper houses in unitary systems have generally been institutionally constrained, they can and do play a political role.
Our argument is simple: Suppose that the ideal positions of the upper and lower houses on a particular bill are X(U) and X(L) respectively, as in Figure 1 . Disregard the points of agreement and focus only on the differences. These differences can be represented by the straight line segment connecting the two ideal points. Compare any point in space (say M) with its projection (M') on the X(U)X(L) line. Assuming that the degree of preference is defined by the distance between X and M, then both the upper and the lower houses prefer M' over M, since M' is closer to their positions than M. So, some point on the segment X(U)X(L) is preferred over any other point in space by both houses. However, along the X(U)X(L) segment, each player prefers a point that is closer to its own ideal point. This representation helps visualize the difference between the efficient and the political roles of the houses. A movement toward X(U)X(L) represents a gain in efficiency and both houses can agree on it, while a movement on X(U)X(L) represents a conflict of interest between the two houses: a political difference. The exact point along the X(U)X(L) segment at which the two houses compromise demonstrates the relative power of each house.
Gains from efficiency disappear only if the point M is on the X(U)X(L) segment, a condition that is rarely fulfilled. Political disagreement disappears only if the two houses have identical ideal points, that is if there is political congruence between the two houses. Upper House Power in the Navette System13 Out of the 36 countries presented in Table 1 , 33 resolve differences through the navette system.14 The navette system is one in which the legislation shuttles between the two houses. Each house reads the bill as modified by the other house until identical legislation is passed or until some stopping rule is applied. We model this process as bargaining between the two houses. The basic premise of our model, which is based on Rubinstein (1982 Rubinstein ( , 1985 , is that both houses of the legislature are eager to reach agreement.
Impatience for agreement can be generated by a series of factors. Legislators are sensitive to the passage of time and to public opinion, which dislikes disagreement when legislation is desired. Legislators are elected for the purpose of enacting legislation and are often perceived by the public as inefficient when they are unable to reach agreement. Witness the complaints of immobilisme made of the French Parliament during the Third and Fourth Republics when governments fell every few months. 1 5 There is, however, another, more important reason for impatience. Each round without an agreement pushes a bill one step further toward possible abortion, or may swing some votes in one house or the other. That is why each house prefers a bill today over a bill tomorrow, and is willing to make concessions in order to achieve a compromise.16
The driving mechanism of our model is the following. Suppose that the difference between an agreement in round 1 and round 2 for the lower house is Y. The lower house should then be willing to concede this amount, Y, in order to speed up the process and agree in round 1 instead of round 2. Obviously, the same argument is true about the other house as well. Moreover, the greater the impatience of each house, the more concessions it should be willing to make in order to reach a compromise. If the houses know each other's level of impatience, they can anticipate the final outcome of the bargaining process and reach agreement immediately. If, however, each house does not know how impatient the other is, the process can continue for several rounds. If the level of impatience of each house is known by the other, our model permits us to make three statements about the balance of power between the two houses.
Before presenting these statements one terminological clarification is necessary. We will speak of a "round" of the navette when a bill is reintroduced in the originating house. We will speak of a "time period" when a bill is passed from one house to the other. Obviously, one round is equivalent to two time periods. An integer number of rounds means that there is a stopping rule (joint committee, joint session, etc.), and that the house that originates the legislation also applies this stopping rule. Table 2 Our model does not address other mechanisms of intercameral conflict resolution. However the reasoning applied above, to systems in which the lower house is decisive, can also be used to deduce the balance of power under other stopping rules as well. If, for example, disagreement is resolved by a joint session which favors the more numerous lower house, its power is decreased as the number of negotiating rounds increases. Again, this is because both houses are eager to reach agreement and the more powerful house offers concessions in order to achieve rapid agreement. Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the two propositions. Consider that the stopping rule specifies the exact point of compromise X. If the lower house has the final word, X = X(L). The model permits us to calculate the compromise point X (o0) where the navette lasts forever (as is the case in several legislatures; see Table 2 ). Consider now a one-round navette: the bill is introduced in the lower house, shuttles to the upper house, then returns to the lower house. If the bill is rejected, the compromise Xapplies. Figure 2 indicates that, in order to avoid these delays, the two houses agree to the compromise X( 1). Similarly, in order to avoid a two-round navette, the two houses would agree to X(2), etc. Each additional round pushes the compromise outcome further away from X, towards X(oo). However, each additional step is smaller than the previous one. The distance between X(2) and X(3) is smaller than the distance between X(l) and X(2), which is smaller than the distance between X(L) and X(l).17 The intuition behind this proposition is more difficult to express. As time passes, the level of concessions a house is willing to make in order to avoid an additional round declines (see Figure 2) . Therefore, the house that first reads the bill is able to extract the maximum concession from the other house. This is the first reading advantage. For the same reason, each potential additional round pushes the negotiation outcome more toward the first reader than toward the second. Over time, this difference increases, so the first reader advantage increases.
These three propositions can be applied in a comparative manner to analyze relative house power between nations. The final section presents the institutional features of bicameral legislatures worldwide. Table 2 provides information about the procedural details of the 33 countries that use the navette system. The table is divided in two parts: financial and non-financial legislation. This is the most consistent distinction between bills across countries. Generally, lower houses have more power concerning financial matters: bills are normally introduced there; the number of rounds is lower than for other bills; and lower houses have the final word in the decision process. Federal countries also usually distinguish between territorial and non-territorial bills and give more power to the Senate on territorial legislation. Less systematic distinctions are made regarding international treaties, defense legislation, etc.
Bicameral Legislatures in Comparative Perspective
The information contained in Table 2 should be read in conjunction with propositions 1, 2 and 3, in order to make two different types of statements: those concerning the application of different procedures within the same country and those (Table 2 , No. 12). The constitution specifies that the executive branch decides where to introduce bills, the number of rounds, and whether lower house votes in last resort (see "Comments," column 5). According to our model, when the French government asks the National Assembly to decide on a bill, it transfers power to this house; of course, our model is not necessary to understand this particular transfer of power. What may be less obvious is that a transfer of power in favor of the National Assembly also occurs when the French government declares a bill urgent and reduces the number of prescribed rounds from three to two (Proposition 1 or 2). A transfer of power between the National Assembly and the Senate is also effectuated when the government decides where to introduce a bill first (Proposition 3).
Similarly, substantial power is located in the lower house when a bill is first introduced there, in countries like Argentina, Australia, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela (Proposition 3).
Extreme caution must be used when extending comparisons to several countries. Remember that all the results of the model are derived holding constant the level of impatience of each house. This condition may not hold for different kinds of bills, or for different time periods (for example, immediately before an election of one house, delay only delay only delay only; Senate cannot amend this house is likely to be more impatient), or for upper houses with different methods of selection. If, however, these strong ceteris paribus conditions hold, one can make several cross-national comparisons. For example, in countries like Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Austria and Spain, when a bill is introduced in the lower house first, their navette systems are identical except for the number of rounds. Our expectation is that the countries that require two rounds (Jamaica and the UK) will have weaker lower houses than the countries that require only one round (Austria and Spain) (Proposition 1 or 2) .
Similarly, in those countries where legislation can be introduced in either house, the shift in power from one house to the other is more important in countries without stopping rules, like Switzerland, India, Italy, Belgium and the United States, than in countries with three rounds, like France; a change in the initiating house in France is more significant than in Australia where the number of rounds is two; and the same change is more important in Australia than in Argentina with only one round (Propositions 1 or 2 combined with Proposition 3). These are examples of the ways one can use the information in Table 2 to make a variety of comparative statements.
Conclusions
The contemporary literature on upper houses is divided between federal and unitary systems. The literature on federal systems emphasizes the balance of power between the two houses, while the literature on unitary systems concentrates on factors such as wisdom, independence or expertise of Senators to explain upper house legislative influence. We labelled this reported discrepancy between influence and power in unitary systems Cicero's puzzle. We focused on the disagreements between the two houses and provided an institutional approach to bicameral legislatures which unifies both unitary and federal systems and resolves Cicero's puzzle.
Our approach assumes that both houses are eager to reach an agreement. It is this impatience that leads them to a compromise where the most impatient house makes more concessions. The final agreement (and the input of each house to that agreement) depends not only on each house's impatience but also on institutional features of the navette system. So, in the absence of political congruence between the two houses, the legislative outcome is essentially a political question. Apolitical analyses of upper house power that rely on the "correctness" of Senatorial input to explain legislative outcomes are incomplete. The institutional analysis provided in this paper rejoins the two separate analyses of political and efficient upper houses under a single theoretical framework that permits the comparative analysis of relative house power.
However, our analysis is partial. It ignores the question of efficient legislation, that is the introduction of bills or amendments which, according to the opinion of both houses, improve upon the status quo. Moreover, our account has only addressed the issue of legitimacy as the source of upper house power in a superficial manner (see note 16). We believe that efforts to analyze, explain, and make more concrete the concept of legitimacy will enable future research to produce a more comprehensive understanding of bicameral legislatures. 
